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In Defense of Speciesism 
The concept of a right to life has 
received a great deal of attention 
recently, chiefly because it figures so 
prominently in many arguments con~
cerning a wide variety of moral 
issues. Arguments concerning the 
morality of abortion, capital punish­
ment, infanticide, famine relief, and 
animal consumption and experimenta­
tion, for instance, frequently invoke 
th is con cept, so cia rity about it is of 
fundamental philosophical and practical 
importance. 
For philosophers, one of the pri­
mary tasks is to determine the legiti­
mate grounds for its ascription. Moral 
persons 1 , that is, beings who by def­
inition have rights (and perhaps 
duties), definitely have this right, 
since it is a basic one. So if neces­
sarily all and only commonsense per­
sons 2-that is, persons defi ned pu rely 
descriptively and, presumably, solely 
in terms of mental capacities-a re moral 
persons 3 , and if (necessarily?) all and 
only moral persons have a right to 
life, then (necessarily?) all and only 
commonsense persons have a right to 
life. Since commonsense persons are 
defined non-morally and non-biologi­
cally, it follows that it is possible that 
some nonhumans have a right to life, 
and possible that some humans lack 
this right. But the latter, it would 
seem, is not just a possibility but an 
actuality: even if the requ isite mental 
capacities are quite elementa ry , a 
human being who is a fetus or a 
young infant,· or who is seriously 
retarded, extremely and permanently 
insane, very senile, permanently cog­
nitively impaired 4 , in a deep and 
irreversible coma, or irreparably and 
acutely brain damaged is not a 
commonsense person, and so would not 
have a right to life. Similarly, many 
if not all nonhuman animals are not 
commonsense persons, so they, too, 
do not possess a right to life. To be 
sure, this does not mean that taking 
the life of such a creature, whether 
human or nonhuman, is morally per­
missible, for there may well be other, 
and weighty, reasons why such killing 
shou Id be prohibited. But it does 
mean that to kill such a creature is 
not to violate a right to life that that 
creature possesses. Grounds for rul­
ing out such killing, if they exist at 
all, would have to be found else­
where. 
Exactly how many humans and how 
many animals, if any, have a right to 
life will depend, on this view, on how 
high the standards for commonsense 
personhood are set. Joel Feinberg's 
standards, which are moderate,S 
exclude all fetuses and, apparently, 
all young infants; 6 Peter Singer's 
standards, which, it would seem, are 
quite low, include a fair portion of 
the animal ki ngdom. 7 Rega rd less of 
what the standards should be, how­
ever, merely being a live member of 
ou r own species, Homo sapiens, con­
stitutes no valid ground for the 
ascription of a right to life. To think 
that it does would be to be guilty of 
speciesism. 
Speciesism, according to Singer, is 
"prefer[ring]. members of our 
own species, simply because they are 
members of ou r species. "8 Such 
preference is, I shall assume, moral 
preference, and includes the ascrip­
tion of a right to life. 9 I take the 
following, then, to be, on Singer's 
view, a sufficient condition for a per­
son, A, to be a speciesist: A 
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ascribes a right to life to X, a live 
member of his/her own species who 
fails to qualify for commonsense per­
sonhood, but A refuses to ascribe a 
right to life to Y, a live member of 
another species who fails to qualify 
for commonsen se person hood but is 
otherwise similar to X. 
Although Joel Feinberg does not 
mention speciesism per se, he appears 
to think that some form of speciesism 
'Iurks behind what he calls the Modi­
fied Species Criterion. The Modified 
Species Criterion is the view that "All 
and only [live] members of species 
characterized by C [where C is the 
set of characteristics individually nec­
essary and jointly sufficient for com­
monsense personhood], whether the 
species is Homo sapiens or another, 
and whether or not the individual in 
question happen s to possess C, are 
moral persons entitled to full and 
equal protection by the moral ru Ie 
against homicide, "10 i. e. , have a 
right to life (as the context makes 
evident). Like Singer, Feinberg 
rejects speciesism, at least as far 
the above principle is concerned: 
as 
Why is a permanently uncon­
scious but living body of a 
human or an extragalactic per­
son . . . a moral person when 
it lacks as an individual the 
characteristics that determine 
moral personhood? 11 
Apparently the question 





no reason; or, in other words, that 
possession of the property of being a 
Iive member of a species generally 
characterized by moral personhood is 
not a sufficient condition for the 
ascription of a right to life. A view 
to the effect that possession of such a 
property is sufficient is sl ightly dif­
ferent from, but importantly similar 
to, the va riety of speciesism identified 
above. For both make membership in 
a certain species of some moral 
weig ht. In the case of the doctri ne 
Singer is concerned with, what this 
amounts to is: 
(SS) (Singer's version of 
Speciesism) A live creature's 
belonging to our own species 
(which, for readers of this 
paper, is Homo sapiens) is of 
some moral weight, and 
enough, in fact, for us to 
ascribe a right to life to that 
creatu re. 
And the view Feinberg has focused on 
is: 
(FS) (Feinberg's version of 
Speciesism) A live creature's 
belong to a species, not neces­
sarily our own, which is gen­
erally characterized by person­
hood, is of some moral weight, 
and enough, in fact, to ascribe 
a right to life to that creature. 
Feinberg and Singer are not alone 
in thin ki ng (SS) and (FS) false-many 
philosophers think the same. 12 How­
ever, in what follows I shall argue for 
(SS), argue for (FS), raise and reply 
to a number of objections, and then 
bdefly note some important conse­
quences of my view and some impor­
tant caveats that should be issued 
with it. 
II 
Two things need to be said before 
I present my argument for (SS). 
Fi rst, my a rgument, like every other 
argument, relies on a number of 
assumptions. Some of these assum'p­
tions will be explicitly indicated below 
and as the argument proceeds. Sec­
ond, in order to facilitate understand­
ing, three crucial cases covered by 
(5S) will be briefly described. My 
hope is that the cases, besides being 
illustrative of the scope of (55), will 
add some flesh to the bare bones of 
argument-and will inject a healthy 
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dose of reality into what might other­
wise seem a rather high-level, 
abstract, and "distant" set of consid­
erations. 
Two assumptions, then: (1) the 
"our own" and "us" of (SS) will be 
temporarily assumed to refer to Homo 
sapiens. This assumption I will later 
discharge. (2) All persons will be 
assumed to be members of some biolo­
gical species. This assumption I will 
not discharge, though i believe it 
could be. 
With these assumptions in mind, let 
me present th ree cases. 
Case One. Suppose a close friend 
offers you a ride home from work one 
day, but because you have a great 
deal of work to do, you decline his 
offer. On the way home his car has 
an unexpected mechanical failure 
resulting in a bad accident. Your 
friend is severely brain damaged,. and 
is no longer a commonsense person on 
even the most liberal criteria of com­
monsense personhood. He is con­
scious, but you find it hard to meet 
his eyes during your hospital visits. 
Case Two. Imagine that you are 
an eighteen-year-old woman who has 
always thought of herself as an only 
child. Today your mother thinks you 
are at last ready for the truth. She 
tells you that you have a twin brother 
who is still alive, a twin brother that 
is severely Mongoloid. Du ri ng the 
next week you visit him at the insti­
tution where he is kept. You don't 
know exactly what your feelings and 
thoughts are-he seems so far from you 
yet so near, too. 
Case Three. It has taken years, 
let us suppose, but you are now a 
licensed psychiatrist, with a first job 
at a state mental institution. The 
th ird day on the job you meet Walter 
Weber, a patient who, behaviorally 
and mentally, is indistinguishable from 
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a dog. But there is something 
vaguely familiar about him, though 
you can't quite place it at first. 
Then you remember. Twenty yea rs 
ago, when you were a child, Walter 
Weber lived down the street from you. 
He was not a close friend of yours, 
and you didn't know him very well, 
but there was no indication that he 
wou Id ever end up as a hopeless case 
in a state institution. On the way 
home from work that day you reflect 
on yourself and the many 'are's and 
'could have been's that separate you 
from your patients. 
My argument for (SS) is based 
partly on some metaphysical or quasi­
metaphysical propositions, partly on 
some contingent but very pervasive, 
well established, and important facts 
about what I'll call the empirical pre­
conditions of human personhood, and 
pa rtly on what seem to me to be 
acceptable moral principles. First, 
metaphysics. 
Every person you and I know iSi a 
human being. (Or at least every 
person who is indisputably such is a 
human being. Purported cases of 
acquaintance with nonhuman persons, 
such as animal persons [chimpanzees, 
porpoises, dolphins, and so on] and 
spiritual persons [deities, the Deity, 
dead relatives, or the like], are 
interesti ng and important, and 
deserving of detailed critical atten­
tion. However, the proper place for 
such attention is elsewhere; a critical 
investigation of such phenomena is not 
possible here.) And even if it is not 
a necessary truth that human persons 
a re one and the same entities as 
human bodies-a position that has had 
a number of eminent defenders-· per­
sonal identity seems to be closely tied 
to bodily identity, with the latter 
seeming to be either a necessary con­
dition for theformer 13 or criteriologi­
cally related to the former. Bodily 
identity and person identity are "cri­
teriologically related," to use the 
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expression in Shoemaker's sense,14 
only if it is a necessary truth that 
bodily identity is evidence for per­
sonal identity. Such a criterion, 
however, really expresses a condition­
for re- identifyi ng, rather tha n for 
identifying, persons, and it is the 
identification of persons wh ich is of 
paramount importance in the moral 
context as far as the ascription of 
basic rights is concerned. Still, the 
principle is not without interest or 
importance, for one of its near rela­
tives, 
(IP) It's a necessary truth 
that the statement 'X is alive 
human being' is good evidence 
for the statement 'x is a 
human person,' 
does concern the identification of per­
sons, and so is relevant in the pres­
ent context. If, then, (I P) or any of. 
the above mentioned views concern ing 
the relation of persons and human 
beings is correct, or if some (perhaps 
weaker) variant on one or more of 
them is correct, then something of 
moral importance has, I think, been 
established. For it would seem, first, 
that there is at least a quasi-meta­
physical linkage between the concepts 
of a person and a human being, and 
second, that ou r abi Iity to identify 
with human non-persons in a way that 
we seem not able to identify with sen­
tient and intelligent nonhuman non­
persons thus has a solid metaphysical 
basis. And it would therefore also 
seem, though this must be taken with 
caution, that there is an intimate con­
nection between basic rights, such as 
a right to life, and humanity, here 
taken biologically. This, of course, 
is not to establish that there is a 
linkage enough to support the flow, 
so to speak, of basic rights into 
human beings per se; but it is to say 
that the metaphysical gridwork which 
supports the flow to persons has a 
stru ctu re wh ich, in some sen se, 
includes human beings. 
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I can well imagine the following 
objection being raised at this point, 
however. 
"Even conceding this highly 
metaphorical business about a 
metaphysical gridwork, why 
should basic rights be attrib­
uted to human non-persons? 
That's what (S5) requires, but 
it is the pt'operty of being a 
person, and that alone, which 
generates basic rights. So 
even if the concept of a person 
is 'caught up with' that of a 
human being, that is not to 
the point at all. Personhood, 
not humanhood, is the basis, 
and the sole basis, for the 
ascription of basic rights. 11 
This objection seems strong, but I 
don't find it unsettling. In brief, I 
th ink that it would hold (,) on Iy if 
ou r concept of person hood were much 
different than it is, only in a world 
very different from the one we have 
(for in our world our initial and per­
haps only purchase on the concept of 
personhood is by way of the human 
form-a point which is a leitmotif in the 
ph ilosophy of the later Wittgenstein, 
and is sketched, to some small extent, 
above), and (2) only in a world much 
better than the one we have, only in 
a world in which the contingent facts 
surrounding human personhood 
needn't be taken into account. Let 
me explain this second point, espe­
cially. 
A human being can function as a 
person only if he has adequate food, 
water, shelter, air, an intact and 
properly functioning brain, and the 
time, ability, and opportunity to 
acquire knowledge and develop his 
intellectual capacities and moral sensi­
bilities. These conditions, among 
others, are what I shall call the 
empirical preconditions for human per­
sonhood (EPHP). If they weren't sat­
isfied, human persons, as we know 
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them, would not exist. In circum­
stances vastly different from those we 
encounter in this world, the limita­
tions on human personal existence 
represented by (EPHP) would not 
have to be ta ken into con sideration by 
persons. But in our world, they are 
at least as obvious, pervasive, and 
important features of our existence as 
the sun, and, barring any radical 
changes in our ability to transform 
ou rselves and ou r envi ronment, they 
are here to stay. Because they are 
located at the center stage of ou r 
existence, they seem to me to be just 
the sort of thing which any adequate, 
realistic morality needs to take into 
accou nt. 
There is one other empi rical fact 
which circumscribes the existence of 
human persons which should also be 
noted in this context. This fact is, 
unfortu nately , ha rd to identify with 
anything like precision. An existen­
tialist label for it might be Radical 
Conti ngency, but a somewhat less 
dramatic title is Natural Contingency. 
We are, everyone one of us reading 
this paper, Fortune's Favored, at 
least to a very great extent. We are 
all persons-that's assured-and we are 
all lucky enough to be living in rela­
tively prosperous and safe times and 
to have the intelligence, knowledge, 
and leisure to read and understand 
articles in learned journals. But the 
first point is the important one as far 
as basic rights a re concerned. We 
are all persons. Not so our brain­
damaged friend, or our Mongoloid twin 
brother, or ou r former neighbor who 
is mentally though not physically a 
dog. What separates us from them is 
what I have called the empirical pre­
conditions for human personhood-that 
and Natu ral Conti ngency, the fact 
that 'the breaks' don't favor every 
single human being, that to a large 
extent each of us simply finds himself 
in a particular position in the world, 
that chance, contingency, luck, the 
laws of nature concerning the 
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development of persons all play a 
large role in determing whether 
(EPHP) are satisfied in any particular 
case. If they are satisfied, the bene­
ficiaries can take no credit for having 
seen to it that they were; that wasn't 
their doing. And if they are not sat­
isfied, the victims deserve no blame; 
that also was not their doing. The 
latter, the victims, are Fortune's 
Fools, or, in the case of the infant 
and the fetus, Fortune's Not Yet 
Favored (if they a re lucky). 
My a nswer to the objection, then, 
IS that basic rights may well depend 
on person hood simpliciter ina world 
in which the' notion of a person were 
easily separable from that of a human 
being, and in which personhood 
wasn't bou nd by biological, social, 
physical, and psychological factors, or 
by the vulnerabilities to which human 
flesh and mind are subject, or by the 
real threats to existence which we all 
face, th reats posed by conditions over 
which we have little or no control-in 
short, by the laws of natu re and the 
particular facts about particular 
human beings and their circumstances 
which, in a very real sense, we are 
simply saddled with. In a world of 
that sort, one in which such things 
didn't have to be taken into consider­
ation, basic rights would be derivable 
from personhood and from nothing 
more. In our world, however, such 
basic (quasi- )metaphysical and inelimi­
nable empirical factors are so familiar 
and so woven into the very texture of 
ou r lives that, perhaps paradoxically, 
we moral theorists may need to divert 
ou r attention from the abstractions 
which we have been so successful at 
teach ing ou rselves to notice-person­
hood, autonomy, interests, the value 
of life, etc.-and to make a special 
effort in order to see that they, the 
patent "bou nda ry" factors, conceptual 
and empirical, are there at all. If the 
notion of basic rights is to be usefully 
employed in the world we have, it 
seems to me that just the sort of 
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factors noted above have to be ta ken 
into accou nt. 
But to say this is not enough. 
The skeptic may return at this point 
to object that the argument goes no 
distance toward showing what sort of 
beings shou Id be ascribed basic 
rights, but only that whatever beings 
are ascribed basic rights, the facts 
mentioned above have to be ta ken into 
consideration. Basic rights, the 
argument would continue, are, what­
ever their content, special, non­
world-bound possessions, possessions 
wh ich if had by someone, a re had by 
him in every possible world. But the 
content of such rights may well be 
world-dependent, as personal life, for 
instance, may take vastly different 
forms, i. e., have vastly different 
(quasi- )metaphysical criteria and be 
subject to vastly different empi rical 
preconditions and natural contingen­
cies, in different worlds. Moreover, 
to take quasi-metaphysical connec­
tions, (EPHP), and Natural Contin­
gency into account in ascribing basic 
rights is to open the door to the pos­
sibility of frogs, fish, and fleas as 
rights possessors-certainly an unto­
ward consequence. From this it can 
be seen that existence precedes 
essence, as far as basic rights are 
concerned: determining who poss­
esses basic rights is and must be log­
ically prior to determining what the 
content of such rig hts are. 
To respond to this charge, I would 
like to present the main outline of my 
entire argument in brief form. An 
explanation of its last major premise 
will, I hope, constitute an adequate 
reply. 
(1) The concepts of a human 
being and a person are not 
related merely empirically, and 
human persons can and do 
identify with human non-per­
sons. This identification-which 
is not sympathy or compassion 
but a recog n ition of oneself 
and what one was (a fetus, a 
child) or could be (brain-dam­
aged, comatose, retarded, 
etc. )-has metaphysical or qua­
si-metaphysical underpinnings 
of the sort described above. 
(2) The existence of human 
persons is constrained by laws 
of nature and by particular 
empirical facts of existence, 
e.g., that there is not enough 
protein in a given child's diet 
for his brain to develop prop­
erly. There is Iittle to noth­
ing that individual human ben­
eficia ries or victims can do 
about this, so far as their own 
case is concerned. 
(3) Chance occurrences, many 
of them unforeseen, to which 
all Homo sapiens are subject, 
may well prevent a human from 
becoming a person (e.g., 
genetically linked retardation) 
or rob a person of h is person­
hood (e.g., senility). Again, 
it is not within our power to 
make ourselves invulnerable to 
such contingencies, or, in most 
cases, to foresee them with 
any great accuracy, or to pre­
vent them from occu rring. 
(4) Human non-persons, then, 
should be ascribed basic 
rights; for although in the 
primary case it is persons who 
are ascribed basic rights, 
equality of opportunity, or, 
better, fairness, requires us 
to ascribe basic rights to 
human non-persons as well. 
If this argument is successful-and 
its last p remi se (that concern ing 
equality and fairness in (4)), has not 
yet been explained or defended-it 
shows that all human beings have a 
right to life, and it does so, in part, 
by applying a principle of equality to 
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human non-persons. How exactly is 
the principle applied, and why 
wouldn't the argument, if successful, 
also show that, say, dogs who have 
the mental capacity of infants also 
have a right to life? 
Part of the answer here lies in the 
'logic' of the principle of equality: it 
applies, in any given case, only to a 
restricted class of things. What the 
principle of equality is applied in 
respect to, e.g., the right to have a 
decent education, determi nes the rele­
vant class covered by the principle; 
e. g., a snail has no right to a decent 
education and need not be accorded 
the same opportu n ity to have a decent 
education as normal human offspring. 
It is, it seems to me, the history and 
possibility of (natural) kind instances 
which determines the scope of the 
principle when basic rights are in 
question. And it also seems to me 
that, in regard to basic rights, human 
non - person's are in the same class as 
human persons. They and not dogs 
are in the same class that we are 
because they are in the same existen­
tial boat: besides the conceptual 
linkage repeatedly emphasized above, 
there are the important facts that we 
identify with them, realize that we 
could be (or once were) them, and 
they could be (and perhaps someday 
will be) us; that they are subject to 
the same unforeseeable (or at least 
unpreventable) unfortunate vicissi­
tudes of fortune, in respect to per­
sonhood, that we are; that given the 
opportunity (a fair chance), they will 
(normally) develop into persons, just 
as we did, or they would remain per­
sons, if foul fortune didn't intervene, 
just as we in fact do. Basically, 
these are the points noted in (1)-(3). 
All apply only to human beings, at 
least so fa r as we cu rrently know. 
If, then, all human beings are our 
fellow travellers (even if it is also 
true, as Cora Diamond says, that 
nonhuman animals are our fellow 
E&A V/3 
creatures 16 ), then all have a right to 
life. For those (live) human beings 
who are not persons are not persons 
just because-and it is this 'just 
because' among other things, that 
distinguishes Homo sapiens from other 
species-they were den ied the opportu­
nity to become or to remain persons. 
Their not being persons is no fault of 
their own but the result of having 47 
ch romosomes (the Mongoloid twi n 
brother), or of being involved in a 
car accident (the brain-damaged 
friend), or of having organic or envi­
ronmentally- induced sch izoph ren ia 
(Wa Iter Weber), or of any n umber of 
causes. To spea k anth ropomorph ically 
for a moment, given this inequity, 
given that the laws of natu re and 
Natu ral Contingency deprive some 
humans of personhood, basic morality, 
perhaps natural law, ensures at least 
the minimum of fairness here, and 
redresses the moral balance, makes up 
for nature's inhumanity to humanity, 
by according basic rights. (While 
nature may display inhumanity to 
caninity, even caninity as a whole, 
such inhumanity is not-in fact is ne­
ver-vis-a-vis personhood [the central 
though, if I am correct, not the only 
ground for the ascription of basic 
rights]. Both our concepts and our 
empi rical theories and laws attest to 
such a fact.) The reach of basic 
rights, then, exceeds the grasp of 
personhood, and that because we live 
in the world, and the decidedly 
imperfect world, that we do. I hope 
that is sufficient to show why Natural 
Contingency and (EPHP) not only help 
determine the content of basic rights 
but also who should be accorded 
them. 
I would now like to discharge my 
assumption that the "ou r own" and 
"us" of (55) refer to human beings. 
If the above argument is acceptable, 
and if, as I have assumed, all persons 
belong to some biological species, then 
the same argument would seem to 




species were picked out by "our own" 
and "us." H. G. Wells's Martians, for 
example, were persons who were not 
Homo sapiens, but, as the novel 
makes abundantly clear, they, too, 
were subject to a range of biological 
vu Inerabil ities and natu ral conti ngen­
cies quite similar to the ones we are. 
And so it wou Id be with every spec­
ies, it seems to me. 
But if (55) is thus established, so 
is (F5). For if every human being 
has a right to life, and if every, say, 
Wellsian Martian has a right to life, 
and so on for every species charac­
terized by person hood, then every 
member of every species generally 
characterized by personhood has a 
right to life-which is just (F5). 
III 
I would now like to raise and to 
discuss briefly seven objections to my 
argument. 
Objection 1. You seem to reject 
sympathy as a ground for speciesism, 
but I don't see that your argument 
differs significantly from a sympathy­
based argument. Aren't you really 
arguing that basic rights should be 
extended to human non- per$ons, 
based on sympathy? Actually, the 
argument is not based on sympathy 
but is primarily Kantian-Kantian in 
spirit if not letter. The same conclu­
sion can be derived, I think, if the 
Categorical Imperative, in, say, its 
first formulation (which requires us, 
human persons, to universalize the 
maxims underlying our actions and 
policies), were applied to a maxim 
which precluded human non-persons 
from having a right to life (such as, 
'Whenever members of the same spec­
ies as myself, subject to the same 
laws of nature, biological limitations, 
natu ral history, and contingencies of 
fortune surrounding personhood, are 
not persons, they shall have no basic 
rights'), or if we took seriou sly the 
Kantian dictum to transform moral laws 
into natural laws (that is, laws of 
nature). It is an unsympathetic Puri­
tan (a Puritan who apparently did ot 
oppose capital punishment) who is 
supposed to have said, "There but for 
the g race of God go I" when he saw a 
man being led to the gallows. The 
spirit of that remark is the spirit of 
my argument. 
Objection 2. Still, your argument 
is a potentiality argument, isn't it? 
How else could the relevant class of 
creatures be picked out? And yet 
potentiality arguments are notoriously 
weak. No merely potential "A" stu­
dent has a right to an "A"; no merely 
potential blind person has a right to 
an extra deduction on his income tax; 
no merely potential benefactor of Mar­
quette University has a right to have 
his name included on Marquette's 
annual list of Friends of the Univer­
sity. Mere potential possession of the 
qualification for a right, then, is not 
sufficient for actual possession of that 
right 17-which is not to deny, it 
should be noted, that in at least some 
cases of potential possession, prefer­
red treatment and /or treatment as if a 
right were actually possessed might be 
warranted. Secondly, the concept of 
potentiality simply isn't strong enough 
to do the work you want it to. The 
brain damaged and senile, for exam­
pIe, may not be even potential per­
sons. I ag ree with you that "mere 
potential possession of the qualifica­
tions for a right is not sufficient for 
actual possession of that right," but I 
have to add that the real question in 
this context is, What are the actual 
qualifications for a right to life? Pro­
ponents of potentia Iity a rg uments 
think that the potential possession of 
personhood is that actual qualification, 
and so could agree with your principle 
yet obviate you r criticism. 
In any case, though, not potential­
ity, but, in addition to the points 
noted under (1), two neighboring 
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concepts provide some of the needed 
backing for my argument. To use 
Thomas Nagel's terms, though perhaps 
with slightly different senses than he 
does, it is history and possibility, 18 
applied in respect to membership in 
the species Homo sapiens, which help 
to determine the relevant class. For 
it is history and possibility, among 
other things, which tell us that the 
fetus, the insane, and the senile 
aren't utterly different from us-aren't 
d iffe rent in th e way th at, say, otte rs 
are-and that the fate of our brain 
damaged friend could be our fate, or 
vice versa. 
Objection 3. On your view, an 
irreversibly comatose human being has 
a right to life. That's not my intui­
tion, not the intuition of many morally 
sensitive people, and not the intuition 
of a number of philosophers. 19 Are 
you asking us to give up our intui­
tion? Probably not-but that may be 
because I don't really think that 
that's your intuition. If, however, 
after reading what I have to say you 
do have, or still have, that intuition, 
then I do ask you to change it. 
My intuition, and what follows on 
my argument, is that the permanently 
comatose have a right to life. But 
that is not to say that it would be 
best, all things considered, or in the 
best interests of an irreversibly coma­
tose human, for him/her to remain 
alive. It may well be best, perhaps 
for everyone, for that human being to 
die. Life under such circumstances 
may be reasonably viewed as undigni­
fied, of no value to the human leading 
it, and without point or purpose. 
Many end-stage terminal cancer 
patients are in very much the same 
position, except that they are proba­
bly in a great deal of pain, and some, 
deciding for themselves that it would 
be best if they were dead, commit 
suicide or request euthanasia. End­
stage cancer patients, though, have a 
right to life. The life-situation of the 
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permanently comatose seems tome to 
be relevantly similar in most important 
respects, except,of course, that they 
are not conscious, and so a decision 
to end life would have to be made by 
others-which is not to say that such a 
decision (for non-voluntaryeuthana­
sia) couldn't be justifiably made. In 
short, if you r intu ition is like mi ne, it 
is that, given the permanent loss of 
dignity, value, and meaning in the 
lives of the irreversibly comatose, it 
may be better, or at least no worse, 
if they were dead. 
Objection lj.. don't have the 
hands or the musical ability of Arthur 
Rubenstein-and all because "cruel 
fate" didn't so grace me. On your 
argument doesn't it follow that I have 
all the pianist- rights of Rub"enstein? 
And since this particular "example is a 
random one, aren't you committed to 
the view that everyone has every 
right that anyone has? That's a 
reductio of your position. It would 
be if I were committed to such a view, 
but I don't think I am. What I 
argue, in part, is that when 
nature-laws of nature and Natural 
Contingency-denies a human being the 
usual qualifications for possessing 
basic rights, namely personhood, 
basic morality, perhaps natural law, 
makes due restitution for such a fun­
damental injustice. But this is really 
restitution, it seems to me, really the 
restoring of what is rightly the pos­
session of a human being, namely 
basic rights. In other words, basic 
rights, unli·ke all other rights (such 
as pianist-rights, whatever they may 
be), seem to be the natu ra I bi rth rig ht 
of humans, at least in the world we 
have. For personhood is species­
specific (so far as we know), and 
within our species the norm: its 
absence, not its pr~esence, calls for~
special explanation. Not so excellence 
as a pianist, pianistic ability, or an 
ability or acquire either trait. Hence 
talk of basic rights as the natural 
birthright of human beings, all of 
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them, is appropriate (while of frogs, 
none of them, is it so); and hence 
talk of pianist rights as the natural 
birthright of human beings out of 
place. Put somewhat differently-and 
certainly extravagantly-it would be 
appropriate to ask the Supreme Court 
of, Justice of the Cosmos for adequate 
compensation for having been denied 
personhood-such a request would be 
reasonable, and the only adequate 
compensation would be the accordance 
of basic rights-but it wou Id not be 
appropriate to ask for compensation 
for having been denied Rubenstein's 
hands and musical ability. Gifts of 
fortune, unlike personhood, are no 
one's b irth rig ht . 
Objection 5. On your view, if one 
member of a species happens to attain 
personhood-whether a a result of a 
freak accident of nature or human 
intervention is irrelevant-then all 
members of that species have a right 
to life. That's counterintuitive, and 
its counterintuitiveness drives me 
away from your species principle and 
back to a purely mentalistic one. Let 
me explain. Suppose that a serum 
were developed which, when injected 
into a healthy kitten, enabled that 
kitten to develop into a feline per­
son. 20 If one such kitten did attain 
personhood, then alJ members of his 
species have a right to life-according 
to you. Now, I don't doubt that that 
particular cat, the one that's a per­
son, has a right to life; but I doubt 
that his being a person has anything 
to do with whether Tabby, my cat, 
has a right to life. Tabby, after all, 
remains the same whether or not such 
a cat exists, has existed, or will 
exist. That, I take it, is a powerful 
argument both for rejecting your 
species principles and for embracing a 
purely mentalistic principle. Actually, 
I think that your objection can be 
handled in either of two ways. (1) a 
speciesist like myself could agree that 
the existence of a super-cat does 
endow every member ~of the species 
Felis domestica with a right to life, 
though that is indeed counterintuitive. 
(2) Or, a speciesist could hold that 
your super-cat was really a member of 
another species, and so not be com­
mitted to the view that, should there 
be such a super-cat, all members of 
the species Felis domestica have a 
right to life. The second alternative 
is in fact more plausible for super­
cats-given the physiological conditions 
necessary for a distinctly personal 
mental life, a super-cat would have to 
be significantly structurally dissimilar 
from normal cats (even if a super-cat 
could mate with a normal cat)-but the 
first alternative may not be implausi­
ble for a species close to personhood, 
such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and 
whales. 21 
Objection 6. Your view entails 
that under certain conditions a mem­
ber of one species has a right to life, 
while a member of another species who 
is otherwise relevantly similar to the 
member of the first species 
has-better, may have-no right to life. 
Singer's right: that's discrimination 
on the basis of species-speciesism, in 
the more obvious sense of the 
term-and every bit as ugly and deplo­
rable as discrimination on the basis of 
sex-sexism-or discrimination on the 
basis or race-racism. As neither sex­
ism nor racism is acceptable, neither 
is speciesism. 22 Although I admit that 
the situation my objector describes 
cou Id obtai n, I don It fi nd that "ugly 
and deplorable" or even discrimina­
tory, given the a rgument of section 
II. And the analogies with sexism 
and racism I find weak, since my 
a rgument does not apply, mutatis 
mutandis to sex or race. The term 
"discrimination" shouldn't be used so 
freely or quickly, I think .... In 
fact, I think it shouldn't be used at 
all, in regard to differential treatment 
on the basis of species, sexual, or 
racial considerations, until the partic­
ular moral importance of each (if any) 
has been determined on the basis of 
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ca refu I individual assessments. 23 
Objection 7. "Compensation, " 
"restitution 11 -these terms don't mean 
the same thing, yet they seem to be 
used by you interchangeably. More 
important, though, is the fact that 
these terms make sense and may well 
be applicable in certain circumstances 
in which relations between moral 
agents are concerned. But, for the 
life of me, I can't see how they make 
sense, much less are applicable, when 
the relations involved are those 
between natu re and individual crea­
tu res who a ren 't even mora I agents. 
It seems to me that you simply per­
sonify nature (and certain selected 
non- persons) and then demand that 
justice be served. Your procedure, 
in short, lacks solid conceptual sense. 
The pa rticu la r mea nings of "compensa­
tion" and "restitution" aren't sorted 
-quite true-but I don't think that 
doing so is important for my argu­
ment, and I don't think that this is 
the place to do so even if it were. 
The more important cha rge, as my 
critic rightly notes, is that the terms 
lack the conceptual backdrop neces­
sary for their application. Here I 
appeal to the fact that they and other 
terms I use are used metaphorically 
by all those who reject (55) and (F5) 
and, in fact, by everyone who 
employs the concept of a basic right 
at all. My aim is to supply an answer 
to Feinberg's question of section I; 
which means, in other words, that I 
try to show that the conditions under 
wh ich a creatu re has a rig ht to IHe 
are world-bound in a number of ways 
that Feinberg and others simply over­
look. I argue that it is not person­
hood simpliciter which ensures the 
possession of basic rights, but per­
sonhood cum its linkage to humanity 
and its world-bound constraints and 
contingencies. "Justice," "restitu­
tion,1I and "compensation" are handy 
metaphors, just as "accord basic 
rights" is; their crucial role, how-
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ever, is only to show why a concern 
with personhood alone is not enough, 
and to link the factors just noted with 
the concept of a right to life. 50 the 
anthropomorphism is not inextirpable, 
just conven ient a nd vivid. 
IV 
If the line of argument advanced in 
th is paper is' basically sou nd, ph ilo­
sophical arguments which in some way 
depend upon a rejection of speciesism 
of the sort I have been concerned 
with are seriously flawed. It would 
seem, prima facie, that discussions of 
abortion would be most seriously 
affected, since a number of important 
and highly influential papers on abor­
tion (which are, in the main, pro­
abortion) are predicated on the falsity 
of (55) and (FS). And the approach 
taken here would also, if sound, help 
to vindicate, and perhaps to reins­
tate, one of the neglected "human 
being" centered treatments of abor­
tion. 24 
But at least as important to note as 
some of the implications of a pro­
speciesism position are the caveats 
which should be issued with it. What 
exactly the possession of basic rights, 
either by competent agents, or-and 
especially-by incompetent agents, or 
by incompetent non-agents, entails in 
terms of concrete requi rements for us, 
finite and limited in time, ability, and 
resources as we are, has certainly not 
been discussed here. 25 Neither have 
the concepts of a person ora human 
being been analyzed or explored, and 
they, too, demand close scrutiny 
before the practical import of specie­
sism can be assessed. In brief, much 
more need be said before the true 
significance of the positive conclusions 
of this paper can be accurately 
gauged. But some terrain has been 
cleared, I hope, and some groundwork 
done, a nd that itself is .not without 
worth or importance. 26 
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